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This paper is about patterns of net borrowing by major "institutional sectors" in the U.S. economy -households, the rest of the private sector or "business," government, and the rest of world -and their relationships with post-WWII business cycles and salient trends. Godley and Cripps (1983) were among the first contemporary macroeconomists to emphasize the significance of net borrowing flows. But the crucial "adding-up" restriction (2) below follows directly from Keynes's (1936) identification of national income with national output (or saving with investment after all other income and outlay flows are netted out) which he may have borrowed in part from institutionalist national accountants such as Wesley Clair Mitchell and Colin Clark (Mirowski, 1989) . Adding-up ultimately dates to the invention in 12 th century Venice of double-entry bookkeeping, codified by the mathematician Luca Pacioli late in the 15 th century.
In the discussion to follow, we begin with net borrowing algebra and statistics, and then go on to a graphical analysis of the history since the 1950s. "Headlines" about the main results are presented, with statistical analysis of trends and cycles in subsequent sections.
Net Borrowing Algebra and Statistics
For any group i of economic actors, an excess of their current expenditures ( i E ) for consumption, investment, and other uses over their income ( i Y ) must be "financed" by higher net liabilities (increases in total liabilities minus total assets). Equivalently, they have to borrow to pay for their investment ( i I ) less saving ( i S ). So their net borrowing ( i NB ) can be estimated by using either expenditure and income (or investment and saving) flows appearing in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) or changes in financial positions from the flows of funds (FOF). In 3 this paper we concentrate on numbers emerging from the NIPA. 1 A sector makes a positive contribution to effective demand if its net borrowing exceeds zero.
In algebra, the value of net borrowing by sector i is 
where we measure all flows in current prices.
For the U.S. it makes sense to separate business from household borrowing flows because their trend and cyclical patterns differ. Unfortunately the published accounts do not provide an explicit breakdown of investment expenditures on the part of the two components of the private sector.
2 One way to get around this problem is to assume that all residential investment is done by households and non-residential investment by business. This assumption does not depart too far from the truth and allows analysis to proceed.
3
Restriction (2) permits useful elementary statistical analysis. To illustrate, suppose that two or more variables i x sum to zero,
1 FOF and NIPA estimates of net borrowing differ from one another for technical reasons as well as unavoidable errors and omissions. The biggest discrepancy is for non-financial business and may amount to 10% of that sector's gross saving (Taylor 2004) . 2 All saving and investment numbers examined in this paper are "gross" in the sense that a more or less arbitrary estimate of capital stock depreciation is not subtracted from them. After such a subtraction, U.S. "net" personal saving is often negative, a statistical artifact widely publicized in the media.
3 Residential investment by business is well less than a hundred billion dollars per year or one percent of GDP. Magnitudes of net borrowing flows by sectors are on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars per year, or a few percent of GDP. 
It will also be true that
for any variable z (one of the i x or an indicator of the business cycle, for example). Restated in terms of correlation coefficients (5) becomes
As will be seen, (5) or (6) provides a convenient decomposition of the effects of changes in net borrowing flows on one another. Positive and negative covariances must be mutually offsetting.
In one specific example, if 
The right-hand side shows the contributions (with a minus sign) of the covariances of i x with the other j x toward "explaining" its own variance. This equation is useful in assessing the twin deficit hypothesis regarding foreign net borrowing, and similar causal assertions. Additional decompositions can be derived by substituting (5) into (4) and rearranging terms.
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Patterns in the Data
In this section we briefly review the general patterns of U.S. net borrowing following WWII and summarize our observations in headline form. The stories (including statistical analyses)
attached to the headlines are set out in the following sections. Figure 1 is complicated but summarizes a lot of information. It shows how quarterly net borrowing flows relate to one another and to the overall business cycle. Borrowing levels are shown as ratios to GDP 4 and oscillate roughly in a range from -7% to +7%. The shaded areas cover the time periods between real output peaks and troughs of NBER reference business cycles. Evidently, trough-to-peak cyclical expansions identified by the NBER methodology last longer than recessions.
Figure 1 here.
Looking first at broad trends, a few patterns (or lack of same) stand out:
The U.S. usually ran a current account surplus (positive foreign net borrowing with the U.S.
lending to the rest of the world) until around 1980 when the economy embarked upon an external deficit with a strongly increasing trend after 1991. The transient external recovery beginning in the mid-1980s was due to dollar devaluation (the Plaza accords), a recession, and American export of military services during the Gulf War. It did not persist.
Before 1980, increasing household net lending (more negative levels of net borrowing across business cycles) offset the mildly upwardly trended government and business deficits to support the surplus on current account. Thereafter, although the fiscal position certainly mattered, rising 6 household deficits maintained a steadier relationship with the almost uninterrupted decrease in foreign net borrowing. As discussed in sections 2 and 3, statistical tests indicate that personal net borrowing was the main domestic counterpart to foreign net lending in the latter part of the 20 th century. One underlying factor appears to have been substantial increases in household expenditures on services in general, and health care in particular.
Clear visual coincidences of movements in the government and foreign deficits only occurred during the Reagan and (second) Bush presidencies. Despite its endless invocation in policy discussion, the "twin deficits" theory of the balance of payments seems to apply for limited periods at most.
Turning to cycles, it appears that especially prior to 1980 household borrowing led the business cycle. Increasingly negative net borrowing (higher net lending) occurred during or just after recessions with borrowing going up (lending dropping off) ahead of the cyclical peak. Relative to GDP, households acquired more net financial assets at the bottom of the output cycle, and less near the top.
The implication is that the covariance of the household net borrowing share and capacity utilization (actual GDP divided by its Hodrick-Prescott trend) is strongly positive, a result that runs distinctly counter to the notion of "consumption-smoothing" built into a big swath of macroeconomic theory. 5 The presence or absence of "expenditure-smoothing" is a more relevant 7 issue, but it has not been widely discussed because economists have tended to ignore capital formation by households. In fact, residential investment is a key contributor to pro-cyclical household net borrowing.
Like households in the US, business sets its net borrowing levels pro-cyclically. However, non-residential investment and business saving track together much more closely than the corresponding flows for households. Throughout the post-war period, troughs in business net borrowing shares tended to coincide with or lag output troughs, while maximum shares overlapped with or led output peaks. Movements in both investment and saving by business contributed to this rather strong correlation.
Unsurprisingly, U.S. current account surpluses (or at least lower current account deficits in the recent period) appeared to track output troughs and analogously, peaks in foreign net lending shares occurred close to output peaks in the U.S. The lengths of the lags, however, were quite variable across cycles. For that reason, pro-cyclical foreign net borrowing does not show up strongly in the statistical analysis presented below.
So where does all this leave government net borrowing? From equations (1) and (2) 
Figure 2 here
The bottom line is that fluctuations in private and public net borrowing offset one another,
but not for the reasons emphasized by rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence doctrines. The private sector does not appear to smooth its spending while the fiscal deficit moves counter-cyclically as traditionally it should. The upshot is the pattern shown in Figure 2 . Moreover, the two domestic sectors' net borrowing flows do not cancel one another fully. As noted above, lending to the U.S.
from abroad appears to be weakly pro-cyclical.
These observations suggest the following headlines:
From the perspective of received macro theory, the biggest story is that household and business net borrowing are not counter-cyclical (although household consumption is). After an analysis of trends in the data in sections 3 and 4, covariance analysis of household cycles is presented 9 in section 5. To flesh out the story, we also look into sources and uses of household disposable income and the relationship of disposable income to GDP.
As discussed in section 6, oscillations of both investment and saving contribute to the procyclicality of business net borrowing. Increases in foreign net borrowing lag the cycle while decreases lead (weakly in both directions).The balancing counter-cyclicality of government net borrowing is the topic of section 7.
In terms of trends, household and foreign net borrowing flows tend to be mutually offsetting, as discussed in section 3.
As a consequence, "twin" foreign and government deficits do not show up prominently in the data. This finding is the major policy headline, and is discussed in section 4.
Finally, recent econometrics (Barbosa and Taylor,2006; Chiarella et. al., 2005) suggests that effective demand in both the U.S. and (Western) "European" economies is "profit-led" How this result may (or may not) square with our observation that demand is "household net borrowing-led" is the topic of section 8.
The Household-Foreign Connection
We begin with an analysis of the apparent trends after the early 1980s in household and foreign net borrowing (with positive and negative slopes respectively). They can be investigated statistically in several ways. We discuss whether there were breaks in trend for the two series in the early 1980s, and then take up factors underlying the rise in household net borrowing. The Johansen cointegration tests on the trace and maximum eigenvalue were performed. The former indicated that there is one cointegrating equation at the 1% level, and the latter signalled two cointegrating equations at the 5% level.
Finally, Chow tests applied to the two series separately did not reject the hypotheses of breaks at time 1983-I.
The presence of breaks in the two series therefore cannot be rejected -statistically there was a change in the patterns of foreign and household net borrowing after the early 1980s. What can we say about causal factors? There has been enormous debate about whether the U.S. current account deficit has been the result of factors internal to the economy or whether it was "imposed" from abroad.
One line of argument for external causality resembles "Dutch disease" analysis of the effects of resource bonanzas. American fiscal and monetary stances are allegedly aimed at keeping the level of economic activity high. A passive exchange rate policy has led to a strong dollar which stimulates imports and holds exports down (Wolf 2005) . Domestic policy choices supposedly have combined to allow the external deficit to drive the other net borrowing flows. A global "saving glut" has been the external force driving the deficit up (Bernanke, 2005) .
But what do the glut (if it exists) and a strong exchange rate have to do with household net borrowing? To the extent that foreign demand for American liabilities stimulated the stock market and housing booms of the recent period by bidding down borrowing costs and boosting asset prices, lower household saving and higher debt could have been a consequence. However, it is hard to understand how the rest of the world was the principal cause of the bubbles. And as we will see in section 4, shifts in household saving have not been major contributors to changes in net borrowing.
On the other hand, other domestic factors have contributed to the trend in household net borrowing. Figure 3 shows, for example, that both disposable personal income and household consumption rose sharply as shares of GDP after the early 1980s. One cannot argue that cost-driven increases in health spending were the unique driving force behind the worsening trade deficit, but they and other internal factors must have played significant roles. One cannot readily test the statistical significance of covariances, but it is easy for correlation coefficients between foreign and other net borrowing flows (always normalized by current GDP).
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The numbers are household, -0.584; government, -0.204; business, -0.006. The first two are significantly different from zero, but again government takes the secondary role.
Two further tests can be considered. A "strong" version of the twin deficits hypothesis would be that household and business net borrowing should have zero covariances with past and future values of foreign net borrowing. The contrary appears to be the case:
(i) The covariances between the government and foreign net borrowing are negative for all leads and lags (up to six quarters both ways) but (ii) The covariances between household and foreign net borrowing are negative for all lead-lag definitions. The numbers are higher in absolute value (usually twice the size) than between the government and foreign net borrowing.
As with the contemporaneous relationship, the correlation coefficients are significant, but the ones for government net borrowing are usually smaller.
Secondly, in light of the results from last section, it is interesting to break the sample in the early 1980s. It turns out that in the second period the negative statistical relationship between the fiscal and foreign deficit disappears (despite President Reagan's famous twins!). It is stronger in the first period, especially with the fiscal leading the foreign deficit. Twin deficit theory appears to be a partial explanation of the foreign deficit only until the early 1980s when the household sector dramatically changed its net borrowing behavior.
Pro-cyclical Household Net Borrowing
Now we turn to cyclical behavior of the time series, beginning with the household net borrowing share of GDP. The analysis is based on equations (5) and (6). "Capacity utilization," or real GDP divided by its trend, is the variable z. We focus first on correlograms for the various series, and then take up covariances.
The first column in Table 1 corroborates the evidence from Figure 1 . The household net borrowing share of GDP leads capacity utilization with statistically significant positive correlation coefficients. It lags with negative coefficients as net borrowing swings downward during the latter phase of a cyclical output expansion. Table 1 here From (1), household net borrowing is equal to investment minus saving. The second column of Table 1 presents lead and lag correlations of capacity utilization with residential investment normalized by personal income. Like net borrowing, investment leads the cycle with statistically significant correlations. It drops off with respect to lagged capacity utilization, with significant coefficients as well. The third column of Table 1 shows that the household saving share is not closely correlated with the cycle. The implication is that the cyclical pattern of household net borrowing is largely driven by residential investment.
With NB as household net borrowing and Y as personal income, it must be true that
The second-to-last column of Table 1 shows correlations of GDP Y / with capacity utilization. The only significant coefficients point to a decline in the ratio in advance of the cycle, explaining why GDP NB / is slightly more closely related to capacity utilization than Y NB / in the last column. Table 2 summarizes results from a deeper probe into household behavior, presenting correlation coefficients of leads and lags in capacity utilization with shares of different spending flows in personal income. The first column shows that consumption is smoothed over the cycle, having statistically significant negative correlation coefficients with lagged capacity utilization. But as just noted, a lower consumption share is not offset by more saving (third column of Table 1 ). The share of taxes (second column of Table 2 ) swings up pro-cyclically instead. The remaining spending flows (interest payments and "other") do not have significant correlations. The link between lower consumption and higher taxes might be construed as consistent with Ricardian equivalence theories but the absence of a saving response belies that interpretation.
6 Table 2 here
To illustrate a bit more about income generation, Table 3 gives the correlogram for the sources of personal income. With the only significant correlation coefficients, the wage share of income leads the cycle, consistent with the long-standing observation that real labor payments (however defined in terms of specific income flows) are pro-or at least a-cyclical. Transfer payments are negatively correlated with capacity utilization (all leads and most lags) as might be expected.
Despite the fact that the correlation coefficients are not significant, the absolute values of the covariances of transfers with the cycle generally exceed those of wages. So in terms of covariances, pro-cyclical wages are more than offset by counter-cyclical transfer payments.
Dividend, interest, and "other" payments have insignificant correlations and generally smaller covariances with capacity utilization than wages and transfers. Increases in dividends lead capacity utilization and decreases lag. The sign pattern for interest payments is the reverse (falling rates presumably lead capacity and rising rates lag), and other payments are generally countercyclical.
Table 3 here
If W stands for wage payments, it will be true that
With
counter-cyclical, the cyclicality of GDP W / cannot be inferred directly. However, as discussed immediately below, a rising non-wage (or profit) share tends to lead the cycle. Some thoughts are presented subsequently about possible relationships among pro-cyclical profits and household net borrowing and counter-cyclical interest rates. Business saving typically rises as the economy emerges from recession and stabilizes or declines later in the upswing. The profit share of business value-added (or GDP) drives its movements. There are many economic theories of profits. For present purposes it is useful to look first at cyclical movements of the wage share, which is equal to the real wage divided by labor productivity. A standard stylized fact is that productivity tends to rise as the business sector passes through a trough and goes into an upswing.
Business and Foreign Net Borrowing
7 Real wage increases usually occur later in an expansion, presumably as the labor market tightens. The labor share first falls after a recession and later rises. An increase in the profit share therefore occurs soon after a recession, followed by a decline. Figure 5 suggests that business saving follows this pattern as well. Table 4 summarizes correlations of the components of business net borrowing with capacity utilization. In the first column, borrowing itself is pro-cyclical aside from negative correlations for relatively distant leads and lags. Consistent with accelerator-based investment theories, the share in GDP of non-residential capital formation lags capacity utilization with positive correlation coefficients and is (weakly) inversely associated with its future movements.
Figure 5 here
The correlation coefficients for business saving suggest that it tends to fall near cyclical peaks and rise near troughs. With longer leads and lags it is positively associated with the cycle. Such results are consistent with the pattern in Figure 5 , where savings peaks during upswings and then drops off as the economy goes into recession.
Movements in both saving and investment contribute to the cyclicality of net borrowing, as is evident from the large number of statistically significant correlation coefficients in the table.
Table 4 here
Finally, the last column of Table 4 signals that correlations for foreign net borrowing with the output cycle are relatively weak. It is correlated positively but insignificantly with lags in capacity utilization, and negatively with leads. That is, as in Figure 1 , the current account deficit tends to rise as the economy emerges from recession and decline during slumps.
Counter-Cyclical Government Borrowing
In line with standard discussions it makes sense to examine net borrowing of the government sector as the difference between expenditures (including investment) and receipts. The correlations appear in Table 5 . Recall from Figures 1 and 2 that the government deficit share of GDP varies counter-cyclically, rising during and immediately after recessions and then dropping off.
Consistent with the correlations for taxes on households in Table 2 , receipts of the government in the second column are positively correlated with current and immediately lagged capacity utilization. The coefficients for all lags and most leads are positive. As with transfers to households in Table 3 (which in fact account for roughly one-third of government spending, along with similar shares for wages and purchases), expenditures are negatively correlated with current capacity utilization and immediate leads and lags. With significant correlation coefficients in the vicinity of current utilization, government net borrowing follows a similar pattern. Evidently, cycles 19 in both spending and income contribute to this outcome. Absolute values of covariances of receipts with capacity utilization are usually about 50% greater than covariances of spending. Table 5 here Table 6 , set up explicitly in terms of covariances (multiplied by 1000) of net borrowing shares as opposed to correlation coefficients, provides another perspective on the counter-cyclical role of the government. The bold-faced entries correspond to significant correlation coefficients in the previous tables. From equation (5) sums of covariances along rows of the table must be equal to zero.
Table 6 here
In the row for current utilization, the government's net borrowing covariance of -0.17 basically offsets positive covariances of 0.055 for households and 0.132 for business respectively. For lags in capacity utilization the government's negative covariances mostly offset pro-cyclical business net borrowing; for leads, household net borrowing takes over business's role. In line with the discussion above, absolute values of covariances for foreign net lending are not very large.
Distribution and Demand
Recent econometric literature (Chiarella et. al., 2005; Barbosa and Taylor,2006) suggests that the profit share leads the business cycle for two reasons,. The first is that effective demand itself is "profit-led" in the sense that over the medium term it tends to rise when the profit share increases.
Secondly, relatively high (low) economic activity is associated with a low (high) profit share emerging from the real wage and productivity dynamics sketched above. The outcome is a counter-20 clockwise damped distributive-demand oscillation in the (capacity utilization, wage share) plane, similar to Goodwin's (1967) famous growth cycle. 
